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Abstract
In this article we examine the industrial relations practices of three large European food retailers 
when they transfer the hypermarket format to other countries. We ask, first, how industrial 
relations in hypermarkets differ from those in other food retailing outlets. Second, we examine 
how far the approach characteristic of each company’s country-of-origin (Germany, France and 
the UK) shapes the practices adopted elsewhere. Third, we ask how they respond to the specific 
industrial relations systems of each host country (Turkey, Poland, Ireland and Spain).
Keywords
Comparative industrial relations, Germany, France, hypermarkets, Ireland, multinational 
companies, Poland, Spain, Turkey, UK
Introduction
The influence of large and frequently multinational food retailers on employment rela-
tions and working conditions in European societies is increasing. Our analysis focuses on 
three of the world’s leading multinational food retailers, who are among the biggest in 
Europe but have received far less attention than Wal-Mart in the USA. Carrefour (France), 
Tesco (UK) and Metro (Germany) are among the top four global retailers. They have 
grown domestically by mergers and acquisitions and the crowding out of smaller retail-
ers; Tesco and Carrefour are now the largest private sector employers in their home 
countries. At the same time, these companies have engaged in rapid internationalization 
over the last two decades, setting up stores all over the world (Wortmann, 2011). 
Frequently these are hypermarkets: very large-surface self-service stores, usually out-of-
town, selling a wide range of both food and non-food goods. Definitions vary from a 
minimum sales space of 2500 m² to 5000 m²; the largest stores have slightly over 20,000 
m². In terms of annual sales, they also vary greatly: an average hypermarket in France 
takes about €100 million, Germany only about €25 million. British hypermarkets rank 
somewhere in between.
In this study we compare the industrial relations practices of the three companies in 
four European host countries. In doing so we draw on a conceptual approach frequently 
applied to investigate human resource management (HRM) and industrial relations in 
foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs) (Ferner, 1997). Such operations 
are assumed to be influenced by both home-country effects (the institutions of the coun-
try of origin) and host-country effects (those of the country of operation). National insti-
tutional differences may be understood in terms of varieties of capitalism theory (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001), which distinguishes between coordinated and liberal market econo-
mies (CMEs and LMEs), or of the national business systems approach (Whitley, 1999).
International comparative analysis of low-wage industries (Gautié and Schmitt, 2010) 
has demonstrated that the employment models dominant in these industries differ funda-
mentally from those found in manufacturing. Carré et al. (2010), in a study of the retail 
industry across six countries, sees this as a typical low-wage and low-skill sector which 
is at the forefront of a process of deterioration in working conditions and employment 
relations. They identify a growing trend towards the fragmentation of compensation and 
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working hours: ‘the retail industry has been a leader in such fragmentation and in experi-
mentation with non-standard hours, segmented work arrangements, and a variety of 
other exit options from the institutions that safeguard job quality’ (Carré et al., 2010: 
260).
Below we first outline the theoretical concepts that have informed our analysis, then 
outline our methodology and the three companies studied. We summarize the main find-
ings from our study of industrial relations in their home countries, followed by those 
from four host countries in which they operate. Finally we draw some general conclu-
sions based on our cross-country comparisons.
The role of sector-specificity and internationalization 
format
Comparative studies of international retailing have frequently indicated that work and 
employment relations are sector-specific and differ significantly from those in manu-
facturing firms. Retailing generally involves a (relatively) high share of female employ-
ment and of part-time work and low wages, even though there are some differences 
across countries (Askenazy et al., 2008; Carré et al., 2010). Retailing is also marked by 
low union density (Dribbusch, 2005) and a lower coverage of collective agreements 
compared to manufacturing. In Germany, some of the biggest retailers are ‘hard dis-
counters’ like Lidl and Aldi, which offer a limited range of cut-price groceries in rela-
tively small outlets. These companies, which clearly deviate from key features of 
German industrial relations and have been severely criticized for their anti-union behav-
iour (Hamann and Giese, 2004), have gained significant influence in the international 
food retailing sector, reinforcing the trend towards more precarious work and employ-
ment (Artus, 2008).
We argue, however, that it is dangerous to generalize from such companies to retailing 
in general. Whilst the Lidl and Aldi business model involves precarious work and 
employment conditions, partly because organizing unions is very difficult in smaller 
retail establishments, larger stores or warehouses may be different. We focus on the three 
European food retail MNCs identified above. Even though they now describe themselves 
as multi-format companies (Burt et al., 2008), it can be argued that the hypermarket for-
mat is, and has been, the core of their internationalization success. Whilst studies in 
international retailing often recognize the role of format effects in terms of the efficiency 
and success of international expansion (Burt et al., 2008), they often neglect the impact 
of format type on work and employment relations. Comparisons of work, employment 
and industrial relations, on the other hand, often neglect the role of different retailing 
formats when diagnosing the weakening of labour and employment relations in retailing 
(Gautié and Schmitt, 2010).
Why should the hypermarket format affect industrial relations? Size matters: indi-
vidual hypermarkets frequently have several hundred employees (in our sample the num-
ber ranged from 150 to 800). We therefore expect quite different results in the retail 
sub-sector segment of hypermarkets, especially when it comes to organization: in larger 
establishments, management is more likely to perceive a need for some form of indirect 
workforce participation mechanism, while trade unions find it easier to recruit (Dribbusch, 
 by guest on August 21, 2014ejd.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
258 European Journal of Industrial Relations 20(3)
2005). We argue that the size of both workforce and investment are crucial for the suc-
cessful operation of hypermarkets, both domestically and internationally. Accordingly, 
we believe that size will moderate sector-specific trends towards the weakening of indus-
trial relations features such as trade union representation and the negative influence on 
wages and working conditions. Thus we expect a sub-sector effect on industrial relations 
related to the size and importance of hypermarket stores, domestically and abroad.
Hence in our cross-national comparison we expect to find a sub-sector effect, which 
will differ from a general downward trend in work and employment conditions in retail-
ing. In the next section we discuss the home-country effects in this industry sector, and 
issues involved when MNCs transfer the hypermarket format elsewhere. We also con-
sider whether sectoral effects might override national typologies.
Research questions and methods
Home-country, host-country and sub-sector influences
There is a broad literature on HRM practices in MNCs. Studies by Almond et al. (2005) 
and Ferner (1997) show that MNCs develop their preferred mode of operation in their 
home country, where they are highly influenced by the institutional environment. When 
internationalizing, they are then inclined to transfer this model to their host countries: a 
home-country effect. Yet where the host-country institutional environment is very differ-
ent, this may force foreign subsidiaries to adopt localized management and HRM prac-
tices: a host-country effect.
Whilst MNCs with headquarters in LMEs like the USA and the UK tend to transfer 
practices from the home country to the subsidiaries (Almond et al., 2005), those from 
CMEs are more likely to transfer work organization and production-related aspects of their 
business models rather than specific industrial and employment relations features, either 
because these are seen as highly context-specific or because they would increase labour 
costs in the host countries (Edwards, 2004). However, given the large size and with it the 
bigger financial and commercial commitments of retail MNCs, especially when operating 
large hypermarkets abroad, it is an open question how far they will adapt to local economic 
and institutional environments or standardize globally. Burt et al. (2008) find increasing 
attempts by all food retail MNCs to standardize certain aspects of the supply chain and 
estate management. This may also affect aspects of industrial relations management where 
practices are seen as crucial for their effective operation as a business.
Host-country institutions such as the educational, financial and industrial relations 
systems and labour market regulations may operate as ‘constraints’ and ‘barriers’ to the 
transfer of home-country models: empirical research has shown how MNCs often have 
to adapt their production models (Djelic, 2001), HRM practices (Almond et al., 2005), 
work organization and work systems (Geppert et al., 2003) and employment practices 
(Edwards, 2004) to local institutions. The strength of this host-country effect varies 
between countries: those with dense employment and industrial relation frameworks, 
like Germany, can provide ‘robust tools kits’ for local managers and employee repre-
sentatives to promote local interests (Williams and Geppert, 2011). On the other hand, 
studies in LMEs, where institutional environments are much more permissive, have 
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found that MNCs have scope for strategic choice, especially when transferring industrial 
relations practices (Dörrenbächer, 2004).
This leads to another important question: how do international food retailers respond 
to host-country industrial relations systems, such as regulations on employee representa-
tion, collective agreements and trade union strength, and do they try to control certain 
aspects employment and industrial relations issues in order to keep local unions in check 
or even exclude them? The latter approach would fit into a global trend of not just react-
ing and adapting to host-country environments but seeking to leverage cross-national 
and global synergies by standardizing elements of their supply chains, for instance (Burt 
et al., 2008). We investigate whether this affects industrial relations in their subsidiaries. 
For example, Tilly (2007: 1823) found that Wal-Mart, a company which also internation-
alizes by transferring its hypermarket format, ‘does not necessarily bring the same pack-
age of characteristics (such as low wages, opposition to unions, and low prices) 
everywhere it goes’. Accordingly, we expect that local adaptations of industrial relations 
in the hypermarket format to host-country industrial relations systems will vary; there 
may be efforts to shape industrial relations in order to control local work and employ-
ment relations abroad.
Research design
We draw on findings from a broader research project, undertaken between 2010 and 
2013, which included a comparative focus on three MNCs operating the hypermarket 
format (Metro-Real, Carrefour and Tesco). The research was conducted by a team of 
researchers working in six European countries: Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Turkey 
and the UK. In addition, one member of the research team had the specific task of col-
lecting data on Carrefour and in France, analysing country and company data and under-
taking expert interviews. One important objective was to compare industrial relations in 
hypermarkets in four host countries: Turkey, Poland, Ireland and Spain. None of these 
has so far been at the centre of mainstream research on the transfer of industrial relations 
practices.
The data on which this article is based were collected through documentary analysis 
of country, sector and company information and through semi-structured interviews with 
managers, employees, works councillors and union officials in all seven countries. A 
total of 139 interviews were conducted, taking on average 60 minutes, and transcribed. 
All empirical material and data were systematically collected and interpreted by locally 
based researchers who speak the native language, if required, and finally compared 
across countries during four team meetings. A key aim of these meetings was to develop 
templates for company and country case studies, based on a comprehensive review of the 
literature in the field. These templates guided data selection and were systematically 
applied when analysing cases across countries and companies.
Industrial relations in the three home countries
In this section we first illustrate how each of the three MNCs fits into its home-country 
industrial relations system by comparing whether and how far industrial relations in the 
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hypermarkets segment of our three MNCs differs from the typical features of the overall 
national industrial relations system.
Carrefour, the French company in our study, invented the hypermarket format in 1963 
(Lhermie, 2003). Metro-Real, the German company, is the result of a consolidation of 
various smaller hypermarket chains within one Group. Tesco, the British company, 
developed the hypermarket format only in the late 1990s, simultaneously in its home 
market and several markets in Eastern Europe (Wortmann, 2011).
Carrefour
Industrial relations in France reflect extensive state involvement in economic affairs 
(Whitley, 1999). Companies are legally obliged to organize elections for works commit-
tees (comités d’entreprise), which gives trade unions a platform despite low membership 
density (Bamber et al., 2011). In retail, union density is even lower than the national 
average, reaching only 2 percent. There is strong competition between rival unions in the 
workplace elections. In the retail sector ‘independent’ lists of non-unionized workers, 
some of whom are directly linked to the company’s management, are frequently more 
important than the representative unions, especially where none of the national trade 
unions have elected delegates (Askenazy et al., 2008: 222). In the retail sector, strikes are 
rare and only in 2008 were the three major unions, Force ouvrière (FO), Confédération 
française démocratique du travail (CFDT) and Confédération générale du travail (CGT) 
able to organize joint country-wide industrial action in the hypermarkets (Bennett, 2008). 
There is a collective agreement for the retail sector which is made legally binding for all 
companies in the sector. This agreement gives employees the right to receive a contract 
with at least 26 hours per week from their employer upon request, but is quite irrelevant 
with regard to wages. For many companies, including large numbers of independents 
and franchisees, it is the minimum wage prescribed by the state (salaire minimum inter-
professionnel de croissance, SMIC) and not the collective agreement that sets the stand-
ard for employees.
In Carrefour there are elected trade union delegates in nearly all hypermarkets, and 
the vast majority of the works committee members belong to one of the national unions, 
FO being the strongest. The position of the unions vis-à-vis the company is relatively 
strong, especially as French laws on industrial action provide safeguards for some mili-
tancy. In the case of hypermarkets this has allowed striking workers to cause serious 
disruption, for example by blocking customer car parks. Despite considerable rivalry 
between the unions, they have been able to negotiate collective agreements in the com-
pany’s hypermarket operations which contain better conditions concerning wages, social 
insurance and working time regulation than the national agreement, and also than most 
other company agreements, including that for Carrefour supermarkets. For example, 
hypermarket workers have a right to a contract of at least 30 hours per week; since 35 
hours represents a full-time contract in France, this renders impracticable the frequent 
practice of retailers to use overtime allocation to part-time workers as an instrument of 
reward and control. Thus Carrefour has a stronger union presence than would be expected 
in the retail sector, and this has led to employment conditions which exceed state regula-
tions and national industry agreements for the sector.
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Metro-Real
In Germany, there is a dual structure of statutory works councils (Betriebsräte) with 
extensive rights to regulate the organization of work but subject to a peace obligation, 
and sectoral collective agreements negotiated by trade unions. Collective bargaining in 
the retail sector has become highly concentrated, following the merger to form the con-
glomerate service sector union ver.di in 2001. On the employers’ side, there was a merger 
in 2002 to form Handelsverband Deutschland (HDE), and a competing association dis-
solved in 2009. The sectoral collective agreement, comprising several very similar 
regional agreements covers about 51 percent of the workers in the West German retail 
sector (East Germany: 28%) and only 2 percent (5%) are covered by a company agree-
ment. This is lower than in manufacturing where 56 percent (25%) are covered by secto-
ral and 11 percent (13%) by company agreements. However, only a few companies in the 
retail sector comply fully with all the regulations laid down in the collective agreement, 
for example concerning the payment of Minijobbers (those working very short part-time 
hours). An even greater difference appears if we compare employees working in estab-
lishments with works council representation: in German manufacturing this is 66 per-
cent, but in the trade sector (including retailing and wholesale) it is only 31 percent 
(Ellguth and Kohaut, 2011).
There are works councils in all Metro-Real stores, a joint works council for the whole 
group and additional inter-establishment works councils (based on a company agree-
ment) at an intermediate level. The latter used to be set up at regional level, but recently 
the focus has moved more to a more local level where representatives from three to four 
stores meet every six to eight weeks. Worker and trade union representation on the super-
visory boards (Mitbestimmung) is also fully established. In terms of collective bargain-
ing, organized workers from many Metro-Real stores are at the forefront of industrial 
action in the retail sector, although there are differences between stores which are rooted 
in the distinct histories of the different merged companies. Metro-Real is one of the very 
few retailers that fully apply the collective agreement, including the full payment of 
Minijobbers. Experiments to operate outside the collective agreement with one or two 
stores that were transferred to a separate subsidiary company, including the first store to 
open until midnight, were short-lived and were terminated in 2008.
Tesco
In the UK, as in other LMEs, the industrial relations system is rather weakly institution-
alized with a low level of labour rights, particularly collective employee rights, low 
coverage of collective bargaining and declining trade union membership, particularly in 
the private sector (Godard, 2002). However, the trade union with a dominant position in 
the retail sector, USDAW (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers), has long 
adopted a form of ‘business unionism’, combining a rather conservative political stance 
with an interest in developing cooperative relations with employers (Lynch et al., 2011). 
A focus of its organizing activities has been the country’s leading food retailers: Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, Morrisons and the Co-op (while Asda is organized by the GMB general 
union). Smaller retailers, including the foreign hard discounters, have received much less 
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attention from USDAW because of the perceived high cost and uncertain outcomes of 
organizing campaigns in small units with anti-union management.
USDAW was the only union recognized by Tesco as representing workers in its stores 
when in 1997 the company demanded concessions regarding flexibility and bonuses, and 
pressed for a partnership agreement. The membership supported this in a ballot (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004). The agreement includes support for trade union membership during 
employee induction and deduction of union subscriptions from wages, helping the union 
to grow significantly and steadily (from 310,000 in 2000 to 430,000 today). A third of its 
members work for Tesco, while two-thirds of its employees are organized by the union. 
USDAW has set up a special branch for Tesco managers and directors, with a member-
ship density of about 20 percent.
The partnership agreement has provided a basis for some collective labour rights 
which are lacking in the UK industrial relations context. Moreover, the partnership 
model was described in our interviews as a measure which provides ‘stability’ and ‘top 
end’ wages for store employees in British food retailing, a stable basis for international 
expansion. Both management and union interviewees stressed that there have been no 
strikes so far, and they did not anticipate any in the near future. The partnership agree-
ment is operated on the basis of employee forums at store, regional and national levels. 
Delegates are elected by all employees and many are union members; overall there are 
more than 1600 employee representatives across the company (DTI, 2007). Interviewees 
on both sides stressed that the agreement helps in improving working conditions, training 
and career opportunities, salaries and bonuses for staff, and that these are better than at 
other food retailers. However, changes to working conditions within the partnership 
framework have created a two-tier workforce: a dwindling number of employees on the 
old contracts and a growing number on new, less advantageous contracts. Newly recruited 
employees have reduced benefits with regard to sickness, overtime and especially 
Sunday payments.
Comparative discussion
Carrefour and Metro-Real reflect many features of their wider home-country industrial 
relations context. Carrefour has the most comprehensive regulation of working hours, an 
issue which fits with the importance of governmental regulation in state-organized capi-
talist societies like France. However, the company not only applies but exceeds the terms 
of national collective agreements for their sector as well as complying with legislation 
such as the SMIC. Metro-Real also complies fully with the terms of collective agree-
ments and the works council legislation. Tesco, unlike other food retail hypermarket 
operators in the UK, has adopted a partnership agreement with USDAW leading to rela-
tively high union density and extensive trade union facilities. The low level of industrial 
relations regulation in the UK permits extensive corporate and union experimentation 
with different models of industrial relations.
Whilst industrial relations in Carrefour and Metro-Real reflect, and in some areas 
exceed, statutory requirements and national collective agreements, Tesco, operating in a 
weakly regulated industrial relations environment, has developed its own corporate 
model which mirrors many of the features of its continental rivals. The possible impact 
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of a size effect was indicated earlier: hypermarket establishments are as large as many 
manufacturing plants, and this can encourage formal systems of employee representation 
(Dribbusch, 2005). Carrefour and Metro-Real were national pioneers in the hypermarket 
segment, followed by Tesco, which adopted this model when it began internationalizing; 
and all three have a long tradition of operating with collective representation. Tesco plays 
a unique role compared to its UK rivals in that it has the most extensive agreement with 
a trade union. This could be linked to its corporate history of relations with USDAW and 
its internationalizing strategy, which is not found among its national rivals. The striking 
similarities between all three companies, which are all at the high end of the sector in 
terms of pay and conditions as well as workforce representation, could reflect both a sec-
tor and format effect. There is evidence that Tesco also extends these conditions to its 
other formats such as supermarkets and convenience stores. However, the analysis of 
such spill-over effects goes beyond the scope of the current article.
The three companies have more in common with many larger manufacturing compa-
nies than with many of their smaller retail competitors (Artus, 2008). Although the 
strength of trade unions in these companies is lower than has traditionally been the case 
in manufacturing, the effects of globalization and coercive international comparisons, 
which have led to a weakening of trade union influence and a decline in wages and work-
ing conditions in the manufacturing sector, have been less marked as food retail services 
and jobs cannot be outsourced to other countries.
Industrial relations in four host countries
In this section we describe briefly the four host-country industrial relations systems, and 
describe the industrial relations features adopted in the hypermarkets established by the 
three companies. This enables us to compare their practices both with their home-country 
models and with those characteristic of the host countries. All three companies have 
subsidiaries in Poland and Turkey, but only Tesco in Ireland and Carrefour in Spain.
Ireland
The Irish industrial relations system was traditionally voluntarist and adversarial; but 
from the late 1980s the relatively strong trade union movement, represented by the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), agreed a series of national tripartite social pacts. 
These set a loose framework for company partnership agreements, especially from the 
late 1990s (Roche, 2007); several companies, including many foreign MNCs, adopted 
such agreements.
Industrial relations in Tesco’s operations in Ireland reflect elements of the broader 
Irish context, with a stronger trade union role than in the UK. When Tesco took over 
Quinnsworth in 1996, its stores were highly unionized. The company has a membership 
agreement with two unions, Mandate and SIPTU (Services, Industrial, Professional and 
Technical Union), although the latter is represented in only a small number of stores. In 
addition, Tesco introduced the deduction of union subscriptions from pay, as in the UK. 
Today, Mandate has a very high membership in the company, constituting about one 
quarter of all its members. There is a well-entrenched network of shop stewards and 
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union activists, and industrial relations have been quite adversarial; for example, 10,000 
employees took part in the one-day stoppage in 2001. In 2005 the firm signed a partner-
ship agreement with Mandate and SIPTU and set up its own customized consultation 
structures, similar to those in the UK. But in Ireland, employee delegates are always 
trade union representatives and collective bargaining has not been integrated into the 
employee forum structure because of union opposition.
Poland
In post-socialist Poland, like other Central and Eastern European countries, govern-
ments have attempted to attract MNCs and other forms of private capital to replace the 
former state-owned companies. The regulation of industrial relations has been liberal-
ized. Trade unionism in the private sector is dominated by two national organizations, 
Solidarność and OPZZ (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych), both 
of which have national sectoral units as well as cross-sector regional structures. The 
absence of sectoral structures at regional or local level, however, means a serious lack 
of coordination at establishment or company level. Unions can be established by a 
minimum of ten employees, and there are over 7000 in total (ETUI, 2010). In order to 
gain representative status they must organize at least 10 percent of the employees of 
the establishment or company and belong to a representative national confederation. 
Works council legislation was introduced only in response to the 2002 EU Information 
and Consultation Directive: a council must be established on the request of 10 percent 
of the employees. In the retail sector there is no sectoral collective agreement, and 
union density stands at an estimated 12 percent (ETUI, 2010). In this permissive con-
text, the forms of trade union representation in the subsidiaries varied considerably 
between the three companies.
In Carrefour, Solidarność has created a supra-store union with representatives from 
around 30 stores and, additionally, four single-store unions. Altogether, less than half the 
hypermarkets have trade union representation. Three works councils have also been 
formed. In 2002 the union signed a cooperation agreement with the company, intended 
as a first step towards a collective agreement which has not yet been realized.
Metro-Real opened its first Polish store, in Szczecin, in 1997, and Solidarność 
soon established a trade union there. The company expanded to over 50 stores, 37 of 
which had Solidarność representation and two OPZZ. Works councils were also 
established. Unlike other foreign retailers in the country, Metro-Real operated its 
Polish stores as formally separate companies, a structure which supported store ego-
ism and hampered coordination between local unions. In this way it took advantage 
of the decentralized form of interest representation and the absence of inter-store 
structures, and did not negotiate a collective agreement. This enabled the company to 
exert pressure to extract concessions, especially from employees at weakly perform-
ing stores. Metro-Real has, however, recently divested its Polish and other East 
European operations.
Tesco signed a partnership agreement with a company trade union belonging to 
Solidarność (with support from USDAW) in 2002, which was renewed for an unlimited 
period in 2005. There are no separate unions at store level but sub-sections of the 
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company union. Aside from Solidarność, there are four more unions in the network but 
all are present in only one outlet respectively. Given the weakness of the unions, no col-
lective agreement is in place. Tesco has, however, transferred its concept of employee 
forums to Poland, with store representatives elected by all employees. Since January 
2011 the company has also run a pilot programme at two stores whereby new employees 
are given positive information about union membership during induction. According to 
the unions, the results have been promising, so they may request that the programme be 
continued and extended to a larger number of outlets.
The permissive Polish industrial relations context, with a highly decentralized trade 
union structure, has thus resulted in a variety of representation forms in the subsidiaries. 
As yet there are no company-level collective agreements but there are early signs of 
cross-store cooperation within Carrefour and Metro-Real.
Spain
In Spain the state plays a significant role in a politicized and conflictual industrial rela-
tions system, with low union density. However, in the large-surface retail sector a special 
situation prevails, indicating a permissive environment despite the strong state role. Two 
‘yellow’ unions – organizations created by the employer and working closely to the com-
pany’s agenda, rather than acting as independent representatives of the employees – 
dominate industrial relations in the hypermarkets. This situation is unknown in other 
sectors, including smaller stores like hard discounters.
Spanish retailing conserved a traditional structure well into the 1970s, and department 
stores, especially those of El Corte Inglés, were the dominant modern retail format. With 
the end of the Franco regime and economic liberalization, foreign investors, starting with 
Carrefour in 1973 followed by many other foreign retailers, triggered a dramatic change 
of retailing within a decade. As trade unions began to reorganize after Franco, El Corte 
Inglés set up two yellow unions, Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales (FASGA) and 
Federación de Trabajadores Independientes de Comercio (FETICO), pushing the two 
big national unions, Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) and Comisiones Obreras 
(CCOO), into a minority position (Royle and Ortiz, 2009). At the last works council elec-
tions in 2010 the two yellow unions gained about two-thirds of the seats in Carrefour 
hypermarkets. During these (and previous) elections claims of harassment and intimida-
tion of supporters of UGT and CCOO were made to UNI Commerce, the European retail 
union federation. Carrefour joined the Asociación de Grandes Empresas de Distribución 
(ANGED) in 1978; the applicable collective agreement is signed by ANGED, FETICO 
and FASGA. Both CCOO and UGT refused to sign this agreement, criticizing elements 
such as working time deregulation, sick leave payments, pregnancy regulations and gen-
eral wage levels (Royle and Ortiz, 2009).
Carrefour’s operations in Spain thus follow the specific pattern of the large-surface 
retail sector, which favours the non-independent unions. There may also be some links 
back to Carrefour’s home-country context where, as mentioned earlier, ‘independent’ 
lists of non-unionized workers, some directly linked to management, are often more 
important than representative unions in the wider retail sector though not in Carrefour’s 
own French operations.
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Turkey
In Turkey the state plays a central role in industrial relations. There is highly restrictive 
legislation, which sets a high threshold for union certification (Uçkan, 2007). A union 
must not only organize at least 10 percent of all employees in a (broadly defined) sector, 
but also at least 50 percent in a company in order to gain recognition. Although employ-
ers are informed about workers’ union membership and trade unionists are not protected 
against harassment or dismissal, organizing campaigns by Turkish unions have in many 
cases met this high threshold, especially in larger establishments, including hypermar-
kets. The union then must apply for authorization by the Labour Ministry. Employers, 
however, may appeal to the courts, which can suspend the authorization for up to two 
years. All bargaining is on a company basis and there is no employers’ association in the 
retail industry. Tez-Koop-İş, the biggest Turkish trade union in this sector and viewed as 
secular and non-communist, organized the workers in all three MNCs.
In Carrefour, Tez-Koop-İş began its organizing campaign in 2003. In 2005, when 2600 
out of 3570 workers had joined, the union applied for the authorization, but Carrefour 
appealed. After the judicial procedure had been proceeding for 13 months, Carrefour 
acquired a local supermarket chain, Gima, where Tez-Koop-İş had already signed an 
agreement. Following appeals from UNI Commerce to the Carrefour head office in Paris, 
the company withdrew the appeal and recognized Tez-Koop-İş in December 2006. A col-
lective agreement was concluded in June 2007 and renewed in 2010.
In Metro-Real, the union campaign started in 2004 and ended in 2005 with 1480 of 
approximately 2000 workers organized. The company did not appeal against certification 
and was the first foreign retailer to recognize trade unions. In 2005 a collective agreement 
was signed, and a second in 2007. During the negotiations in 2010 a disagreement arose 
over wage increases; the union issued a strike warning, despite the employer’s threat to 
close stores, but a new collective agreement was signed before a stoppage took place.
In Tesco, Tez Koop-İş started a struggle for unionization in 2003 and was supported by 
both national and international labour unions. The union twice applied to the Ministry for 
workplace majority verification, and this was granted twice. However, Tesco twice appealed 
the decision, but finally reached an agreement to recognize the union in August 2012.
Tesco is the only multinational retailer operating hypermarkets in Turkey that has not 
yet signed a collective agreement. But the company has set up employee forums at store, 
regional and national levels, as in its home country. Interviewed workers claim that 
forum representatives are mostly elected from amongst workers who will not question 
management prerogatives, and are therefore unable to represent workers’ interests or 
challenge management in an effective way.
The Turkish context has clearly shaped the development of industrial relations in all 
three companies, with the main Turkish retail union now represented after following the 
legislative route to recognition and collective bargaining rights.
Comparative discussion
The host-country environments investigated show varying degrees of permissiveness in 
terms of the industrial relations model the companies can develop; and there are 
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differences between them in the way they operate in their subsidiaries. These result from 
the interplay between the companies’ different industrial relations systems based in their 
home country, and the level of adaptation to the host-country context. Metro-Real, which 
has firmly established relationships with trade unions and works councils in Germany, 
has been relatively open to trade union representation in its subsidiaries. However, in 
Poland it promoted the fragmentation of trade unions in the majority of its stores with its 
decentralized company organization. Carrefour, coming from a background of more 
adversarial relationships with trade unions in France, at first opposed trade union author-
ization/recognition in Turkey, but finally conceded and has also signed a collective 
agreement. In Poland, trade union representation covers less than half of its 80-plus 
stores. Finally, in Spain it has set up works councils, which it is obliged to do by law (as 
in its home country). However, the company collaborates with the two yellow unions 
that dominate the sector. It is in Tesco where industrial relations in its home country and 
three host countries show the most striking similarities. In all cases it has attempted to 
transfer key elements from its domestic model, but with different implications given the 
different host industrial relations contexts: while in Ireland the unions have retained a 
strong representation in the forums, these have been used as a substitute for union recog-
nition in Turkey and in Poland there is as yet no collective agreement although the union 
is part of the forum process.
Carrefour and Metro-Real originate in less permissive home-country industrial rela-
tions environments and have thus had less scope and incentive to develop strong corpo-
rate models of industrial relations there. Their industrial relations models, being rooted 
in highly institutionalized systems of legislation and sectoral collective agreements, can-
not easily be transferred to subsidiaries in other countries with very different environ-
ments. There are indications that both have made use of opportunities to avoid some of 
the more restrictive elements of their home-country industrial relations by working with 
the prevailing host-country norms, especially in the highly permissive industrial rela-
tions context of Poland but also in Spain. In contrast, Tesco operates in a permissive 
home-country context in which it has, over years, developed its own corporate model for 
handling industrial relations issues. It attributes much of its success to this model and 
seeks actively to transfer it to new host environments, with varying degrees of success as 
it is often difficult to find unions which understand and have the desire to cooperate in a 
partnership model. Where unions are weak, as in Poland, the model is viewed as enhanc-
ing their role in the workplace. Where they are stronger, as in Ireland and Turkey, the 
company industrial relations model is viewed as an attempt to reduce their role.
In terms of the size and format effects promoting similarities in the companies’ indus-
trial relations approaches, all accepted the need for employee representation and involve-
ment, although the forms this takes do vary in the different host countries.
Conclusions
Our article has drawn on current debates on the question whether MNCs transfer home-
country industrial relations practices abroad or adapt to local host-country systems. 
These debates have traditionally focused on the manufacturing sector. In this article we 
have applied ideas about transfer of industrial relations practices and local adaption to 
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host-country industrial relations systems to a different sector, food retailing, and also to 
a specific subsector, hypermarkets.
Accordingly we have asked whether country-of-origin industrial relations models, 
which underpin work and employment in home-country hypermarkets, are transferred 
abroad; if so why; and if not, why not? We found evidence confirming the broader find-
ing (Dörrenbächer, 2004) that MNCs with headquarters in CMEs, such as France and 
Germany, make less attempt to transfer industrial relations practices elsewhere, as their 
home-country industrial relations systems are highly context-bound, whereas those with 
headquarters in LMEs, where the industrial relations system is more market-based and 
fragmented, may seek to transfer their own corporate models.
We also raised the question how our three international food retailers respond to host-
country industrial relations systems of an LME type, where we expected few barriers to 
transfer of domestic practices to host-country industrial relations systems. This was true 
of Poland, but it was not as clear with Ireland. In Turkey, despite being a state-organized 
and more coordinated economy, there are greater barriers for unions to overcome and 
opportunities for employer resistance. In Spain, despite being a CME, there are some 
loopholes which allow companies even to develop their own preferred trade unions. This 
points to varying degrees of strategic option for MNCs, but the trend in all host countries 
is towards greater permissiveness to attract MNC investment. There is evidence of work-
force representation in the subsidiaries across all three MNCs, though the form this takes 
varies. Thus we argue, as does Tilly (2007) in regard to Wal-Mart, that the European food 
retailers act in an eclectic way when adapting to local industrial relations systems. Tilly’s 
study showed that though the American retailer is normally associated with negative 
practices in terms of industrial relations and employee representation, it does accept 
some union and employee representation in certain contexts around the world. In this 
article we look at European companies with very different domestic contexts, albeit 
where workforce representation is more accepted, even in the UK, and with investment 
in mainly European host countries, so similar influences apply: in general, independent 
workforce representative bodies and expectations by both managers and workers that 
these should operate. One reason for the similarities is that all three MNCs in our sample 
have a long history of dealing with unions in their home countries (unlike their American 
counterparts), well before they started to internationalize. Thus there is a historical ele-
ment which needs further investigation.
We finally return to the overall question raised at the outset: what makes the indus-
trial relations practices of European food retailing MNCs transferring the hypermarket 
format abroad different from other MNCs which transfer different food retailing for-
mats, such the discounter or supermarket format? Apart from home- and host-country 
industrial relations influences, our study has also shown the importance of certain con-
tingencies, such as the retailing format (in our case hypermarkets) and the organiza-
tional size of establishments (in our case large stores), which have moderating effects. 
An example can be seen in the establishment by all three companies in their home 
countries of stable industrial and employment relations mechanisms, based on indirect 
forms of employee involvement, despite the differences in their national institutional 
contexts. In all cases this went well beyond minimum sector standards. This points to 
sub-sector influences – the size and importance of hypermarkets in these companies’ 
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operations compared to the anti-union approaches of food discounter MNCs based on 
small store establishments. The industrial relations systems set up helped hypermarket 
store management to engage routinely with, and hence control more effectively, employ-
ees’ needs, forestalling conflicts and ensuring smooth operations. Likewise, all three 
companies established indirect forms of representation in hypermarkets abroad, 
although the forms they took varied. On the basis of our findings we question whether 
there is a generalized ‘Wal-Mart effect’ in retailing, involving the global spread of low 
wage, low skill employment with fragmented working hours, as argued by Gautié and 
Schmitt (2010). We found support for Tilly’s more nuanced view of MNC operations 
(2007), identifying some adaptation to different host contexts to further company objec-
tives. In particular, all our companies were keen to comply with the law and not be seen 
to transgress local norms, although Carrefour has thus far resisted international protests 
that its approach in Spain conflicts with the International Framework Agreements it has 
signed.
Last but not least, we would reiterate that the size and importance of the hypermarket 
sub-sector in terms of employment and investment make it more likely that employers 
will show similarities in their industrial relations practices to other large manufacturing 
companies in the home country, and also promote similarities in practices which override 
differences between CMEs and LMEs. This is an issue which needs further research, but 
our study shows evidence of the influence of local unions in the large European hyper-
market stores investigated, despite often high levels of part-time, female employment 
and the weaker position of unions in the retailing sector in general. However, there is 
counter-evidence in another sub-segment of international food retailers, who transfer the 
hard discounter format abroad, of limited opportunities for unions to have influence at 
store level. In this case, unions seem to have much weaker tools and changes to this sub-
sector would require further national and transnational industrial relations regulation to 
permit more influence on work and employment relations in these types of stores (Artus, 
2008). National industrial relations systems in Europe, including trade union policies and 
practices, have been developed predominantly for large establishments, whether in the 
manufacturing or retail sectors of the national economy.
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